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Working Paper No. 6 Mai 2024

Impressum

Zitierung: Jonathan Rinne, Malte Janzing, Helen Bönnighausen (2024): Property vs. Usage Rights: Attitudes of Citizens and Political Elites, Working Paper Nr. 6, Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 294 »Strukturwandel des Eigentums«.

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Lektorat: Judith Körte, Kevin Gimper **Reihengestaltung:** Uwe Adler, Weimar ISSN: 2752-2741

Herausgeber: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 294 »Strukturwandel des Eigentums« Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, JenTower, 23. OG, Leutragraben 1, 07743 Jena

www.sfb294-eigentum.de

Property vs. Usage Rights: Attitudes of Citizens and Political Elites

Jonathan Rinne, Malte Janzing, Helen Bönnighausen

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between property ownership and usage rights in contemporary societies, focusing on attitudes towards everyday objects such as cars, housing, and music, from the perspective of the 'Sociology of Our Relationship to the World'. We use a multi-method approach, i.e., drawing on data from surveys of both citizens and political elites and informing these data through a corpus of narrative interviews. We quantitatively analyze how different factors, including socio-economic traits (e.g. wealth, gender, age) and party affiliation, shape citizens' attitudes towards these issues and try to make sense of these findings by qualitatively exploring how these factors irritate and influence their relationship to the world. Our collaborative results reveal nuanced differences across individuals and objects, highlighting the interplay between personal characteristics and property attitudes. Moreover, we investigate the attitudes of political elites and observe that they tend to align with constituents who share similar demographic traits, particularly concerning wealth and regional background. Thus, the interdisciplinary cooperation between the SFB-projects "Economic Property and Political (In-)Equality" (B04) and "Making Things Available" (C06) contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding property relationships and their societal implications.

Keywords: Property Attitudes, Usage Rights, Sociology of Our Relationship to the World, Sharing Economy, Political Elites, Unequal Democracy

Introduction

How important is it to citizens to hold property in everyday objects?¹ Not least since the recent debate around the sharing economy (e.g. Rifkin 2001; Loske 2015; John 2017; David 2017; Belk, Eckhardt, and Bardhi 2019; Schor et al. 2020), there is a narrative that in everyday life, private property loses (some of its) relevance and other forms of securing access to objects flourish. Macro trends, such as the emergence and growth of services like carsharing (e.g., ShareNow), accommodation (e.g., AirBnB), or media streaming (e.g., Spotify) support the claim that the relevance of private property in consumption goods decreases. At the same time, in Germany, the sales volume of cars and vinyl records as well as the share of homeowners increased – suggesting that owning private property (still) plays an important role in people's lives. In light of these ambiguous indicators, this paper seeks to explore the attitudes of people toward property relative to usage rights for everyday objects.

Why should people care about property, when other arrangements may also satisfy their needs? People experience attachments and thereby potential benefits from property, which go beyond their mere right to usage. Following the 'Sociology of Our Relationship to the World' by Hartmut Rosa (2019), our premise is that property instigates attachments in at least three dimensions: A relationship to objects, social others, and oneself (Rosa 2023, 22ff.; Katzer et al. 2024). 1) Concerning the relationship to the concrete property object, people develop a relationship of "disposal" (Rosa 2023, 22), which allows them to use it at will but also manipulate or even destroy it, if it is within legal limits. Moreover, people develop a relationship of care with property objects, i.e., the attachment to the object incentivizes people to handle it prudently, maintain it and even develop emotional bonds. 2) Property also creates a social relationship between the owners and others. Property ownership allows for excluding others from the use of an object, to rent out and sell it. Being an owner distinguishes individuals from others in relation to the object. 3) And finally, the ownership of objects goes alongside a specific self-relationship. Owning a Mercedes can lead to owners identifying themselves as a 'Mercedes-driver' – in addition

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¹ We would like to thank the members of the projects B04 and C06 for enabling this joint research effort. Specifically, we thank Marion Reiser and Lars Vogel for their invaluable work in drafting and conducting the quantitative surveys. Moreover, we thank Judith Körte, Elisabeth Sparsbrod, Henrike Katzer, Christoph Henning, Jörg Oberthür and Hartmut Rosa for their instrumental role in collaboratively discussing and interpreting the qualitative interviews as well as contributing ideas for this article. We also very much appreciate the insightful feedback of the two reviewers, i.e., Christoph Henning and Stefan Schmalz. Not least, we are greatly indebted to Judith Körte and Kevin Gimper for their outstanding editorial support in drafting the article.

to controlling and caring for it and excluding others from using it. Considering these (subjective and objective) benefits that the institution of private property retains, its relevance for everyday objects appears probable. Yet, given the broad range of alternatives (rentals, leasing, company cars (*Dienstwagen*), Sharing, or using public transport and bicycles) and the high costs of acquiring and maintaining property, it is an empirical question to which degree people ascribe importance to these benefits.

We do not expect that the attitudes towards property in comparison with usage rights are distributed equally across society, though. Because the ascribed importance of property stems from (in part) the relationships that a property object establishes for a property subject, we assume two factors to influence the attitudes:

First, the attitudes vary between different everyday objects, because the utility of disposing of the object freely, using it exclusively, and self-identifying with it is presumably different depending on the concrete object (cf. Dittmar 1992). For instance, it has been shown that cars fulfill important functions beyond mobility – among others for social status, family lifestyles, or particular identities (e.g. Heine, Mautz, and Rosenbaum 2001; Sonnberger, Gallego Carrera, and Ruddat 2013; Haustein 2021) – such functions cannot generally be assumed for CDs and records on the other hand. However, we do not understand these differences as essential properties of the objects. With our theoretical perspective, we can recognize that their specific embeddedness in everyday life creates a differentiated set of relationships. This helps us to explain why something changes for people when a car is no longer owned but rented – because the car, as a specific object, does not necessarily change at all. What changes are the practices of usage.

Second, the importance of property varies between people depending on their characteristics. We assume that the (subjective and objective) benefits of property apply distinctively, and the ascribed importance of property differs in regard to seven aspects: a) The wealth level determines the purchasing power to obtain ownership in objects as much as it implies a degree of existing ownership in objects. Consequently, the function of economic safeguarding of property objects such as housing likely differs. Similarly, the role of property as a means to social status likely differs per wealth strata. b) The existing ownership of a specific object can shape the property attitudes towards the category of that object. For once, because actual ownership could let individuals experience the benefits or irrelevance of property. Moreover, owners could take property in everyday objects for granted and thereby underestimate the role it plays in their lives. Not least because of the specific socialization and following societal roles that they entail, c) gender, d) age, and e) education determine the practical utility of distinct objects as much as self-

identification with objects and their following utility in generating social status. For instance, car ownership as a means to social status is more prevalent among males in particular strata in society (cf. Zwick 2013, 72). f) The party affiliation, mediated by the differing ideological background, implies specific milieus, which likely influences people's perception of the practical and social utility of property in objects. g) The property regime, mediated through the socialization of the subjects, likely affects the more general attitudes towards private property, and therefore also specifically its importance concerning everyday objects. While, in Germany, only a single regime exists, we assume the lagged influence of the socialization of subjects in the former East German socialist system and, thus, differences between Eastern and Western Germans. These seven aspects do not pose an exhaustive list of all potential factors for property attitudes, nor do we list the mechanisms underlying these factors comprehensively. Our aim was to establish that these factors are potentially of interest and warrant a closer look when exploring the attitudes empirically.

We expect both factors (object-specificity and individual characteristics) to shape attitudes independently, but we also assume interaction and mediating effects between both. For instance, wealth effects are likely different for everyday objects depending on the economic costs associated with them. Similarly, the relevance of distinct everyday objects changes over the life stages, thus, the importance of property distinctively differs per object and age.

In addition to the attitudes of citizens, a second interest of this article lies in exploring the views of political elites. Especially the attitudes of those who decide on the formal rules constituting the property regime (i.e., legislators) towards ownership of everyday objects are important for understanding the societal role of property. While specific evidence on legislators' attitudes towards property in everyday objects is lacking, empirical studies have established that they generally represent the higher strata of society better. That means legislators share, on average, the attitudes of citizens from the middle and upper classes and income levels (e.g., Elkjær and Klitgaard 2021; Elsässer, Hense, and Schäfer 2021; Reiser, Rinne, and Vogel 2024). One mechanism for the better representation of higher strata lies in the biased descriptive representation and shared social background, i.e., the fact that most legislators are from these strata themselves (e.g., Elsässer and Schäfer 2022). Due to the elaborated distinct influence of the social background on the relationship towards property (objects), we assume that the biased congruence between legislators and citizens also exists concerning attitudes towards property. That said,

² In the following, we use the terms political elites and legislators synonymously.

legislators have an incentive to align with party cleavages and represent their party affiliates substantively. Therefore, we assume that a party affiliation between citizens and elites mediate the influence of other factors – including that of wealth and ownership status.

This article empirically explores the attitudes toward the importance of property relative to merely obtaining usage rights. To study the attitudes towards property we focus on the patterns that stand out for three central everyday objects in today's societies: Cars, housing, and music (e.g., CDs or records). We employ a multi-method approach and draw, for once, on quantitative surveys of citizens and legislators conducted in Germany by the project "Economic Property and Political (In-)Equality" (B04) to investigate the distributions and patterns of attitudes. To interpret and contextualize these, we additionally draw on qualitative interviews conducted in Germany by the project "Making Things Available" (C06). Our results reveal that citizens' attitudes on property ownership are complex. They are specific 1) to respective property objects, 2) to individual characteristics, and 3) both factors interact. Furthermore, we show that the attitudes of political elites diverge from those of citizens more generally, but rather match those of citizens they descriptively resemble, i.e., particularly those of wealthier citizens. After laying out the methods and data we employ, in the following, we present our findings in more detail and develop potential explanations and avenues of further research.

Data and Methods

To investigate the subjective relevance of property relative to usage rights, we employ primarily a survey-based approach. We draw on original data from a representative population-based survey in Germany. The computer assisted telephone interviews with 2125 respondents were conducted from June to September 2022. The survey's design quotas employ oversampling of three subgroups of citizens to investigate their preferences specifically: First, residence in Eastern and Western Germany to assess differences between both (see e.g. Klingemann et al. 2002; Holtmann 2019); second, citizens within the bottom 10%, and third, within the top 10% of the income distribution in Germany to assess the effects of extreme levels of economic resources (see e.g. Pande 2020; Schürz 2019). Oversampling of the latter is particularly important due to their disproportionately lower participation in surveys (Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret, and Piketty 2021; Kennickell, Lindner, and Schürz 2022). Post-stratification weights were calculated based on gender and age, and the differentiation between Eastern and Western Germany.

To study the views of the political elites in Germany, we draw on original data from a survey conducted with legislators. The computer assisted telephone interviews with legislators from the Bundestag and those of German State parliaments (except Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Saarland, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Thuringia)³ took place between May and December 2022, overlapping with the population-based survey. A total of 391 legislators participated, equaling a response rate of 21%. Of the legislators who participated in the survey, 30% are members of the Bundestag, the remainder being in State parliaments. Eastern and Western Germans legislators are split 33% to 67%. Party affiliation, gender, and age of legislators, as well as their tenure and candidacy mode (direct/list), are roughly comparable to the overall distribution of 1922 legislators in selected parliaments. Post-stratification weights were calculated based on named attributes.

Measures

We juxtapose the relevance of ownership in comparison to usage rights to estimate the attitudes towards property. For each of the three property objects under consideration (i.e., cars, housing, and music), we ask respondents to indicate the degree to which they agree with the statement that ownership is not important as long as usage rights are given. Specifically, concerning *car ownership* we prompt for responses to the statement "It is not important to own a car, if I can rent it," for *home ownership* "It is not important to own an apartment, as long as I can rent it," and concerning *music ownership*, "It is not important to own music, e.g., as a CD or file, as long as I can stream it." Respondents report their degree of agreement to each of the statements on a 4-point Likert scale (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree). The Participants in both surveys were randomly split, each prompted to answer only one of the three items on ownership.

We measure the *wealth* of respondents in terms of their self-placement within the wealth distribution on a 10-point scale. Based on the self-placements of respondents we construct a variable with three groups: Responses from 1 to 3 are coded as a low wealth

³ City States (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg) and states with an upcoming or very recent election were excluded from the sample (Saarland, NRW). Moreover, Thuringia was omitted as it is the home state of the University of Jena, which was conducting the interviews.

⁴ Original wording in survey: "Solange ich ein Auto zur Nutzung leihen kann, ist es mir nicht wichtig es zu besitzen."

⁵ Original wording in survey: "Solange ich eine Wohnung mieten kann, ist es mir nicht wichtig sie zu besitzen."

⁶ Original wording in survey: "Solange ich Musik streamen kann, ist es mir nicht wichtig diese z.B. als CD oder Datei zu besitzen."

level; responses from 4 to 7 are coded as a medium wealth level; and responses from 8 to 10 are coded as high wealth level. Drawing on self-placements has various benefits over polling the valuation of one's wealth: It exposes less sensible data and thus lowers the likelihood of non-responses. This is especially important for citizens with high wealth levels and politicians, who have greater privacy concerns in this regard (Johansson-Tormod and Klevmarken 2022). Moreover, respondents are unreliable in accurately reporting valuations of their wealth (Le Roux and Roma 2019). Not least, the item on selfplacement within the wealth distribution is available across both surveys, contrary to wealth valuation items, allowing us to compare citizens with legislators. In our data, we find support for the validity of self-placement to measure wealth levels. In line with recent studies that investigate the role of distinct assets for the level of wealth (see Waitkus 2023), the self-placement values strongly correlate with real-estate ownership, which is not used for personal housing, as well as financial and corporate assets, while e.g., the home ownership correlates relatively little with the self-placement. Notably, differences in self-placements within the wealth distribution exist between the citizens and legislators. The mean score for citizens is 4.03 (SD = 2.22), while legislators report on average 5.38 (SD = 1.67). This is not surprising, given robust evidence that the German Bundestag is composed of a disproportionately high share of members who have wellpaid professions and above-average educational levels (Pyschny and Kintz 2022).

We also rely on survey responses to measure if citizens are *real estate owners*, i.e., if they possess their primary residence or any other real estate property or not. The *age* of respondents, their *gender*, if they live in *Eastern or Western Germany*, and if they possess *tertiary education* is measured through dedicated question in the survey in the case of citizens. For political elites we draw on auxiliary information from a legislators database to construct these variables.⁷ In the analysis, we use an aggregated measure for age with four groups (i.e., 18-34, 35-49, 50-64, and 65+).

Statistical Analysis

For our descriptive analysis of the views on property among citizens, we employ weighted multivariate ordinal logistic regressions to investigate statistically significant⁸ correlation of the outcome variable (i.e., the different responses concerning the importance of property ownership) with the variables on respondents' traits (i.e., their wealth, age, gender, tertiary education, ownership of real estate, and if they are placed in Eastern or

⁷ Specifically, we draw on project B04's "Abgeordnetendatenbank" to supplement information on legislators.

⁸ All references to statistical significance concern the 95 % confidence interval.

Western Germany). In the following, we only report significant group differences in regard to the responses to ownership of cars, housing, and music according to the regression analysis. To indicate the differences in response patterns, we report the weighted proportional distribution of responses in each of the levels of the 4-point Likert scale. Moreover, we run multivariate linear regressions on the same outcome variables as a robustness check. These corroborate findings of the multivariate ordinal logistic regressions. The results are plotted to visualize the effect of the different factors (see Figures A 1, A 2, and A 3 in the Appendix).

Concerning the variables that exhibit differential response patterns among citizens, we investigate separately with which groups political elites align with. To that end, we assess if responses differ significantly between legislators in comparison to the distinct groups within one variable (e.g. between legislators and citizens with low wealth levels, with medium wealth levels, and finally with high wealth levels) using weighted bivariate ordinal logistic regressions with treatment coding for the contrasts (see Tables A 2, A 5 in the Appendix). Moreover, we report percentage point differences in the share of responses for each of the levels in the 4-point Likert scale between, on the one hand, legislators and, on the other hand, citizens generally as well as distinct groups of citizens specifically.¹⁰

Qualitative Interviews

In order to contextualize and interpret the observations from the survey, we refer to a corpus of narrative interviews in addition to theoretical considerations. These interviews were collected and analyzed in a different context and with a different research interest. The qualitative data corpus consists of 44 individual interviews, 5 expert interviews and 3 group discussions, which were conducted in three fields – housing, cars, music – of the sharing economy. The interviews were analyzed using the documentary method according to Ralf Bohnsack, a qualitative and reconstructive approach that not only reveals the self-reflective arguments of the subjects, but also implicitly formulated experiences (see Kruse 2015, 24f.; Bohnsack, Nentwig-Gesemann, and Nohl 2013, for initial results und further methodological considerations of this work see Katzer et al. 2024); Oberthür et al. 2024). This method of analysis allows us to make detailed observations at the level of microsocial practices. However, the qualitative data is not systematically analyzed for the purpose of this paper, but rather informs the interpretation of the quantitative results. We exploratively attempt to link the knowledge

⁹ Plotted distributions contain additionally 95 % confidence interval error bars.

¹⁰ Plotted differences distributions contain additionally 95 % confidence interval error bars.

from our qualitative work with the quantitative findings presented here, to provide explanatory approaches and generate hypotheses for further research. In this sense, it is a multi-methods approach that subsequently attempts to fruitfully combine the interpretative surplus of different research designs.

Results


Citizens' Attitudes Towards Car Ownership

Asking citizens about the relevance of owning their car, 27% disagree strongly, 28% disagree, 21% agree, and 25% agree strongly that it is sufficient if they have access to a car. Thus, responses are relatively evenly distributed, with a slight tendency towards a placing value in car ownership.

An explanation for these results can be found in the specific function of cars. Our research has shown that the functional utility of cars is experienced as freedom from care and social duties as it guarantees a more flexible lifestyle (more on these experiences below). Owning a car, in contrast, seems to go along with a complex emotional relationship, including issues as self-image or the social status. The findings of our interviews show that car owners include the car into their social everyday life. The ownership of a car is perceived as a social practice: They use the car for taking the children to sport activities, for helping the grandparents out or for driving to a swimming lake with friends. There seems to be an impression that the car is used most of the time in the interests of others – a driving for the partner, the children, friends. The private car is an expression of sociality. Thus, while the mobility function of cars can be substituted by property alternatives, a close integration into everyday life creates specific benefits of property. In the light of the evenly distributed responses, there seems to be balance in these functional roles of cars.



Figure 1: Citizens' Attitudes Towards Car Ownership (Weighted Distribution, 95 %



Despite a generally relatively balanced response behavior, the views differ significantly when considering citizens wealth levels and their party affiliation (see Table A 1 in the Appendix).. Regarding the levels of wealth, citizens with low and medium levels of wealth show comparable response patterns, while the affluent ascribe substantially less value to property: 65% agree strongly that owning a car is not relevant as long as one has a car at their disposal (see Figure 1).

How can these wealth-related differences be understood? Usually, the car-sector is linked to expressions of freedom or autonomy. However, our interview findings indicate a more complex relationship: In specific socio-economic milieus, flexibility and independence seem to be associated to access and usage rights for a car (e.g. leasing, sharing) and not to ownership, as one might expect. This is grounded in multiple reasons. First of all, this form of independence can be attributed to the fact that when renting cars, one doesn't have to commit to a single car but rather has a choice among many. SUV, convertible, small city car – one can choose the perfect type of car depending on the occasion. This also includes the opportunity to continuously test new models, allowing to satisfy technical curiosity or 'driving pleasure' effortlessly, and to always be 'up to date'. A

second, significant factor is the reduction or elimination of care work: There is no need to take care of repairs, insurances, or taxes.

Citizens from a wealthier background have a highly mobile lifestyle as well as a lack of time and, thus, prefer to have access to a car at any time and any way instead of owning one specific car ('my car'). Spoken with the Theory of Our Relationship to the World, there is no sentimental attachment or dependency on having an object (car, house) to oneself. It matters that it is available, without any of the commitment that comes with owning a car. When it comes to sharing, the availability can be further increased because cars can be rented spontaneously as well as parked at any location due to free-floating-models. With this social practice one has access not only to one car but to an (urban) area in total – it is an expansion of the world range. An equivalent way of a relationship to the world exists when leasing a lot of different, new car models.

As we can see, the practice of renting cars combines the maximum of freedom with the maximum of accessible mobility and is therefore a very attractive alternative to owning a car – especially for citizens with greater wealth. On the contrary, citizens with limited wealth often hesitate due to the unpredictable nature of costs. Moreover, and this can be a great assistance in understanding the quantitative outcomes, our qualitative interviews indicate that citizens with medium and lower levels of wealth are more attached towards cars, as in the phenomenon of the family car. Such cars are usually strongly associated with family dependencies and obligations. One example that is described several times in the interviews is an old (economically valueless) car that is given to someone by their grandfather for their 18th birthday. It is described how the ownership of this specific car leads to having to make certain errands or trips. Although these obligations are perceived as a burden, they are usually accompanied by a very intense, personalizing relationship with the object. Interestingly these expectations disappear when the car is disposed of and switched to carsharing. While ownership seems to create a very practical obligation to care, the same obligation does not arise with access-based use.

Regarding the party affiliation, affiliates of two parties also show differences in their evaluation of property of cars. First, affiliates of B90/Grüne report significantly greater support to waive ownership of the car they use. On average, the share of support amongst B90/Grüne affiliates is 17 percentage points greater than for citizens generally, not least driven by the share of 35%, who indicated strong support for the functional equivalent to ownership of cars. Secondly, citizens who affiliate with the AfD significantly deviate from citizens affiliated with other parties or without affiliation: 38% have a strong preference for owning a car, which is 15 percentage points above the share of other

citizens who strongly disagree that usage rights of cars are sufficient. As Figure 1 also highlights, the share of citizens who strongly believe that functional equivalences to ownership of a car is sufficient is the lowest among AfD affiliates (13%).


The statement by affiliates of the German party B90/Grüne that having access to a car is sufficient, can certainly be attributed to ecological motives: Concerning the car, environmental pollution or the excessive use of space (i.e., one person/SUV) is criticized. Therefore, it seems quite apparent that voters with strong interests in environmental protection tend to use alternatives such as carsharing because it promises efficient car usage or the reduction of traffic and emissions. In addition, renting instead of owning can be seen as an individual distancing and a social statement at the same time: They don't want to have a personal connection to a car, and they don't want it to have an end in itself. Affiliates of B90/Grüne don't want to have private property in this matter, the use of a car is purely for its functional mobility service. It must also be considered that voters of B90/Grüne are primarily located in cities. It is therefore easier to have access to sharing-services or public transport so that one is hardly relying on a private car. In summary, our hypothesis is, that the affiliates of B90/Grüne (as the *urban middle class*) are shifting from ownership to sharing/using.

In contrast, the affiliates of AfD are characterized by a strong preference for owning a car. This might also be due to the fact that AfD voters predominantly come from rural areas, especially in Eastern Germany, and therefore rely more extensively on a car. However, there are explanations linked to specific relationships to the world that can be ascribed to the affiliates of AfD. Specifically, values that the AfD stands for (Niedermayer 2020) such as preservation, conservativism, and sovereignty can influence the relationship to the personal ownership of things, and cars in particular: Citizens with this kind of relationship to the world often seek to have something exclusively for themselves, a domain where they can maintain control, set the rules and find stability - a reliable constant in their lives without any unpredictable changes. In this context, the private car can be understood as an instrument with which they can isolate themselves from the world and retreat into their private sphere. The car can be perceived – also in a special sense – as a protective 'cocoon' that provides a barrier against external intrusions. The ownership of a personal car symbolizes a clear distinction between the interior (private, protected) and exterior (public, hostile), signifying independence from the political influence of others (anti-establishment).

Citizens' Attitudes Towards Home Ownership

Turning to the second property object, respondents were asked if they consider it important to be a homeowner vis-a-vis to rent their housing. Overall, 15% disagree strongly, 28% disagree, 25% agree, and 32% agree strongly that it is sufficient if they have access to housing. Thus, the greater share of citizens generally does not consider property of their residence to be essential. In general, our results reflect that Germany is a rental market, meaning housing is dominated by rental relationships in comparison to other European countries. Significant differences in responses exist between citizens depended on their wealth levels, their age, whether they are from Eastern or Western Germany, and whether they are currently homeowners (see Table A 4 in the Appendix).

Figure 2: Citizens' Attitudes Towards Homeownership (Weighted Distribution, 95 % Confidence Interval)



Similar to the attitudes on cars, the affluent show different response patterns than citizens with low and medium levels of wealth. Wealth related differences in responses are, indeed, the greatest compared to other traits of respondents. And again, the affluent ascribe substantially less value to property, with 60% agree strongly that home ownership is not important, which is 24 percentage points greater than for low levels of wealth, and

even 38 percentage points greater than for citizens with medium wealth levels (see Figure 2).

We trace the survey result that home ownership seems to be less important for the wealthy back to their lifestyle elaborated in regard to cars: The wealthy are often characterized by a very mobile lifestyle which is concentrated on several cities, countries and properties. We strongly assume that the very affluent possesses numerous real estate holdings. However, since our survey focuses on home ownership, it is about the relevance of owning 'this one, my home'. Considering this, it seems fairly obvious that this necessity does not exist for the very wealthy. They can move through the world with a feeling of security, self-evidence, self-efficacy and reach that makes the kind of security provided by 'my own home' seem unnecessary. Rather, ownership in this high form of identification tends to be a burdensome bond that implies (social) obligations and restricts mobility. We can see parallels between this and the attitude towards owning a car among the wealthy. Privacy and individuality are established through other concepts.

In the middle-class milieu, on the other hand, property plays a comparatively large role, not only financially (i.e., as retirement provision), but also emotionally as 'my home'. 11 While very wealthy citizens are likely to own several properties and possibly even live in several of them, the middle class has one home of their own that is cherished and cared for and where they have their place in the world – 'this is my house, my garden, my dog, this is where and who I am'. Owning instead of renting a home is therefore not only a social status symbol, as self-affirmation of one's place in the middle class, but a specific positioning to the world. It is an important factor in the development of individuality, as well as a way of separating oneself from the world outside as an attempt for self-determination.

Wealth issues are often linked to questions of visibility, reach and the feeling of being able to dispose of the world. The experience of seeing the world as intruding from the outside and life as dominated by others can also be a factor in the desire for ownership. Especially citizens with middle or lower levels of wealth are more likely to feel the world is being ruled over them and, experience their own home (similar to one's car) as protective against external interferences. However, for citizens with lower levels of wealth, owning their own home seems to be comparatively less important than owning

¹¹ See the forthcoming dissertation "Sharing is Caring? Fürsorgeverhältnisse im Homesharing" by Henrike Katzer in which she examines the meaning of owning and sharing a home.

their own car – we assume that owning their own home is often not attainable for financial reasons and, as a result, not part of their mindset/lifestyle.

Turning to real estate ownership, a specific component of wealth, reveals one of the starkest patterns: The evaluation of the importance of homeownership significantly depends on whether the respondents are actually homeowners, it does not, however, depend significantly on ownership of real estate more broadly. As Figure 2 illustrates, those who are no homeowners hold more positive attitudes towards renting than homeowners. Yet, response patterns of citizens with and without real estate other than one's home do not differ significantly. Perhaps experiencing the feeling of being able to dispose of the space exclusively is necessary for instigating a stronger attachment to property – and might help overcome potential economic irrationalities behind acquiring housing property.

At first sight, responses do not differ substantially between age groups: Among 18 - 34 aged citizens, reported content with renting is at 54%, among those aged 35 - 49 it is 52%, among those aged 50 - 64 it is 64%, and finally for those 65 and older it is 58%. Yet, the multivariate regression indicates, that citizens above age 65 show different response patterns that cannot be explained by other factors: They are twice as likely to report higher agreement that rental is sufficient than those aged 35 - 49.

In fact, it would not have been surprising if the desire for home ownership had not varied so much between the different age groups, as it could be explained by the desire for privacy that runs through all age groups in society. This wish is more effectively met through private ownership than renting, given the increased dependencies and uncertainties associated with the latter, such as the possibility of the landlord reclaiming the property for personal use. We can find this desire for privacy among the elderly as well as among younger and middle-aged citizens. Regarding the latter, it must be considered that especially in middle age, increased uncertainties in planning and responsibilities can lead to a stronger need for security and precaution: Throughout the middle stages of life, family obligations become a key factor, but also traditional societal ideals (family with a house, garden, and dog) are widespread in large segments of society, extending even into the 18-34 age group – if not yet fulfilled, then at least as a wishful thinking. In terms of our relationship to the world, we can speak of an attempt to place demands on yourself and the world, to see ownership as a way of planning and controlling the own way of living.

At second sight, however, it seems counterintuitive that the elderly are much more of the opinion that renting is sufficient. The desire to retreat into a private, undisturbed space tends to grow with age. That said, it must be taken into account that elderly citizens tend to look back on their own lives with more serenity – it has all worked out without ownership or too much monitoring; values other than material possessions presumably seems to play a role here. Additionally, for homeowners the question may arise in retirement, what to do with their house: Do the children want to inherit the property? Or does it have to be sold due to reasons as age and care? This subject, which is being researched in the field of residential care (cf. Adkins, Cooper, and Konings 2020), will also have had an influence on the response behavior.

Different attitudes towards the value of homeownership exist also between Eastern and Western Germans - the latter ones place a greater value towards owning one's home than the former. In Western Germany, a 6 percentage points higher share strongly disagrees, and a 7 percentage points higher share disagrees that rental is sufficient compared to Eastern Germany. In Western Germany, homeownership is likely more important, due to factors such as historical path dependence, variations in the rental market structure, and persistent economic disparities between the West and the East. Post-World War II, private homeownership in West Germany was actively promoted through state initiatives, such as favorable loans for house building or small-andmedium-enterprises (SME) financing by the banks, hereby establishing a societal expectation of a 'right to property.' In contrast, Eastern Germany has been shaped by frequently shifting forms of governance and property redistribution, leading to distinctly different encounters with private ownership. Furthermore, wealth inequality between Western and Eastern Germany emerges as a pivotal factor: Individuals in Western Germany generally possess larger financial resources, serving as starting capital and easing access to credit. In essence, our statistical data affirms the enduring disparities between the Eastern and Western states (cf. Saalfeld and Mann 2024).

Citizens' Attitudes Towards Music Ownership

Lastly turning to the importance of owning music rather than just being able to stream it. Among citizens, there is a clear tendency to consider property in music to be not particularly relevant: 19% disagree strongly, 20% disagree, 25% agree, and 36% agree strongly that it is sufficient to have access to music by streaming, without strictly owning it. Though, significant differences in the attitudes exist between citizens depended on their age, their gender, and whether they possess tertiary education (see Table A 9 in the Appendix).




Figure 3: Citizens' Attitudes Towards Music Ownership (Weighted Distribution, 95 % Confidence Interval)

In the technology- and digitization-driven field of music streaming, the idea prevails that access to music will in the long term fully replace the ownership of physical records:

"The cloud based music services [...] certainly seem convinced that users are ready to move from ownership to access, so long as this access includes almost all the music they could imagine wherever they happen to be. Music in the cloud is an attempt to make the music commodity available everywhere. Your music. Anytime. Anywhere" (Morris 2015, 175).

Even though our data shows that a majority of respondents (61%) partially or fully agree that access to music is sufficient over ownership, we also see that the vision "from ownership to access" (Rifkin 2001) is far from being realized. A significant proportion of citizens still attaches value to ownership.

If we look at the latest figures on the purchase of sound recordings and files, we interestingly find that the proportion of music-buyers is considerably smaller than the proportion of citizens who ascribe value to ownership in our data: A survey conducted by

the German Music Industry Association (Bundesverband Musikindustrie 2023: 33) in 2022 shows that around 7% of Germans still buy CDs, 3% music downloads and 0.9% vinyl records. This reveals that participation in access-based music services does not necessarily lead to the rejection of ownership as a mode of appropriation of music. But at the same time, a perceived value of ownership does not necessarily lead to the purchase of records.

The difference between attitudes and actions can be attributed to the personal significance of sound carriers already acquired in the course of life. Many people today have CD collections but no longer have a CD player. We could observe this constellation several times in our interviews. Although they can no longer play the CDs, they also cannot dispose of them. This may be due to the high emotional value of the records, but from a perspective of a 'Sociology of Our Relationship to the World' we can relate it to their status as property-objects, too: People feel an obligation towards them or even a relationship of care, because its *theirs*. At the same time, this relationship to the material object constitutes a specific relationship to oneself: The object enables identification with the musical content or the phase of life in which it was acquired. While objects can become part of an *extended self* (Belk 1988) in this sense, they are also a material way of exhibiting this affiliation to others. But just because the ownership of material objects can certainly provide such a relationship, it does not mean, that there cannot be functional equivalents without individual ownership – at least for certain social status groups or in this case: age groups.

Figure 3 shows that the support for 'merely' streaming music declines significantly with the age of respondents. In the youngest age group of citizens, those between 18 and 34, 86% agree or strongly agree that streaming is a sufficient substitute for owning music. For the oldest group, 65 years or older, this idea finds only support of 40% of citizens. Conversely, older citizens tend to attribute greater value to music as a property object.

The generational effect we found is to be expected under these circumstances. However, this is not just about ownership, but also about materiality. The two are difficult to separate within the field of music records. We assume that the effect of age in our data expresses a path dependency of the musical practice. Older people have grown up with sound carriers, have owned them ever since and organize the appropriation (*Anverwandlung*, see Rosa (2023, 24)) of their music in an object-mediated way. Although most older people also use streaming media, material property objects remain habitually central to the appropriation process. Younger and especially very young people are partly 'streaming natives'. They are establishing new practices of appropriation that are no

longer dependent on sound carriers¹². Nevertheless, material objects still play a role here, as can be seen, for example, in the record boom (cf. Greenberg 2023), which has affected young people in particular (but is currently hardly relevant in terms of society as a whole). However, the ownership of sound carriers is considered secondary in the vast majority of cases. First there was the streamed music, then the purchase. The purchase expresses symbolic appreciation, provides material support for artists and much more. But the purchase does not serve to make music available. In this respect, ownership is not a necessary or sufficient condition for music consumption. The respondents can simultaneously rate ownership as less important and still purchase records. What appears to be a cognitive dissonance here, actually points to different functions of ownership of material objects.

Interestingly, for the field of music also gender differences emerge. A greater share of women reports that for them sharing is sufficient. Conversely, men have a 4 percentage points higher critical attitude towards streaming as a functional equivalent of music compared to women. Even when controlling for other factors with a multivariate regression, these differences remain statistically significant.

This might not be a surprise. In research on property attitudes, it is generally assumed that on average men are more materialistically oriented than women. As a consequence, it is also assumed that they are on average more oriented towards ownership of material objects. The known figures on music buyers show a corresponding result: Of those who buy music as a CD or download, two thirds are men. For vinyl records, the figure is as high as 90% (Bundesverband Musikindustrie 2023, 33). Also, we would assume, that 'collecting' is typically a more male-connoted practice and therefore, for example, ownership of material record collections might be more important to men (Elster 2021, 70; Baudrillard 2007). Again, this does not have to mean that men are generally less engaged in streaming services, insofar as streaming and the purchase of sound recordings are not mutually exclusive practices.

Lastly, the evaluation of owning music differs depending on the level of education of citizens. Those who have a university degree are significantly more favorable to streaming music. Among citizens with tertiary education, 70% agree or agree strongly that streaming is sufficient, while only 58% citizens without a degree support this claim. The multivariate

¹² The curation of personal playlists is one such practice of appropriation according to the forthcoming dissertation "Playlistkuration statt Plattensammlung. Eine weltbeziehungssoziologische Analyse von Praktiken der Musikrezeption im Streaming-Zeitalter." (working title) by Malte Janzing.

regression confirms that such education related differences exist independent of the wealth level of respondents.


The fact that we found no correlation with the economic self-positioning of the respondents makes this result particularly interesting. While economic factors play an important influencing role for ownership attitudes in the fields of homesharing and carsharing, music streaming exhibits different patterns. One possible explanation for this could be that sound carriers are much more important as cultural capital than as economic capital. While the ownership of cars or real estate seems to have a higher value as an economic security for citizens with low levels of wealth than for the affluent, an analogous conclusion could be drawn at the level of cultural goods. Material artifacts could play a more important role as cultural capital for citizens with lower levels of education than for citizens who are able to access other representations of cultural capital more flexibly due to a high level of education. Such a capital-theoretical hypothesis, following on from Bourdieu, could also be linked to the famous observation by Peterson and Kern (1996) that elite classes ("highbrows") increasingly distinguish themselves less through identification with elitist music, but rather through their connoisseurship and appreciation of music from all social milieus. Because they are musical "omnivores", it could be assumed that the possession of specific identity-forming material sound carriers is less important to them. In fact, this "omnivorous" way of appreciating music is particularly well reflected in streaming media. In contrast, we have already emphasized the importance of material objects for citizens' self-relationships. If I feel that I belong to a particular style of music, band or scene – or that those belong to me –, CDs or records offer me a way of directly expressing this affiliation.


In any case, the social transformation from ownership to access in the three fields of interest can be observed in its most advanced phase here. Interestingly, it seems that the practice of music streaming has penetrated society much further than carsharing. Music streaming can then be seen as an avant-garde field of the access-based relationship to property objects driven by educated elites – though our data does not provide direct evidence for a teleological transformation towards property alternatives. From the perspective of property theory, this makes music a particularly interesting and promising field of research. Precisely because economic and spatial (urban-rural) factors are of little importance, it is possible to conceive why the ownership of sound carriers or files continues to have meaning for many citizens and has not already been completely replaced by access. We gain this perspective by differentiating between the three dimensions of world relations: For many people, there is a value in the object (physical

records) that cannot be explained by the object itself. Following on from our theoretical approach, we see that ownership of material objects does not only establish a specific relationship to things, but also specific relationships to oneself and others. In this sense, sound carriers do not only provide technical access to music, but can also be important instruments of identity and self-presentation. Access-based music streaming cannot easily replace these characteristics of ownership. Nevertheless, we find that practices are developing insofar as digital natives and educated elites ascribe less value to property objects in the field of music¹³, which indicates a generally more access-based appropriation (*Anverwandlung*) of music in the future.

Citizens' Attitudes Compared to Political Elites Regarding Car, Home and Music Ownership

Do political elites share the views of lay citizens or do they hold significantly different attitudes towards property? To investigate this question regarding car, home and music ownership, we zoom in on the conditional response patterns of citizens with certain traits discussed above and investigate, whose views on the relevance of property legislators share.





¹³ This statement applies only to the very specific property object of sound carriers. Not included in the quantitative survey is the significance of ownership of other material objects that are relevant in the field of music: e.g. smartphones, speakers, headphones etc.

Figure 4 illustrates how the views of the legislators deviate from those of citizens concerning the relevance of car ownership. The bars per response category (i.e., 'agree', 'strongly agree', 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree') indicate whether elites agree more (positive values) or less (negative values) that property in an object is not necessary as long as they possess usage rights to that object. Concerning cars that means specifically that the share among legislators who indicate that usage rights to cars are sufficient is about 12 percentage points higher than for citizens (i.e., 7.8 higher for 'strongly agree' plus 4.6 higher for 'agree').

These more indifferent views on possessing property in cars could stem from a variety of aspects that sets the everyday life of legislators apart from those of citizens. First, while legislators do not have a personal staff car, they have a right to use cars of the Bundestag for official duties. Therefore, they experience the availability of automotive mobility without ownership – potentially leading a considerable number of legislators to shift their opinion on property in cars. Moreover, legislators spent a considerable amount of time in their respective capitol. Thus, the share or legislators living in a metropolitan area is larger compared to the overall citizenry. And a city that offers public transportation and a multitude of carsharing or taxi offerings does not necessitate a personal car as rural areas do. Thus, presumably differences exist because of the different lifestyle, defined by high mobility and a work life where varying cars and drivers are often provided, compared to the average citizen.


Now, how do the views of political elites overall – i.e., not divided according to specific parties – align with citizens of different wealth strata and party affiliations, which featured specific response patterns? Comparing to citizens with different wealth levels does not indicate that legislators align extraordinarily well with either low, medium, or high wealth levels: Elites place less importance on property of a car than citizens with low and medium levels of wealth, but considerably more than affluent citizens (see Figure 4). In numbers, the odds that citizens with low and medium wealth levels more (strongly) disagree that it is not important to own a car if they can rent it are roughly 40% of those of legislators, while the odds for the affluent are three times higher than for elites (see Table A 2 Appendix). Potentially, these differences are an artefact of legislators' own status and wealth, which puts them below very affluent citizens, yet above the middle class in terms of economic resources and wealth.

The attitudes of political elites align to varying degrees with the views of differing party affiliates (see Figure 4, also Table A 3 in the Appendix). To begin with, party affiliates of the SPD and citizens without party affiliation, we can find that they are significantly more

critical of car-ownership than political elites. The odds that these two groups of citizens report lower support for the functional equivalence is about 40% and 50% respectively. What is also striking is that the regression indicates the greatest differences exist for AfD affiliates. They diverge the most from the elites in terms of both ownership and usage: Compared to the elites, a 19 percentage point higher proportion of affiliates state they strongly agree that owning a car is not important and that having access to cars is sufficient. At the same time, a 19 percentage point lower proportion report they strongly disagree with this. Among other things, this ambivalent result can likely be attributed to the AfD's very heterogeneous electorate, which ranges from far-right nationalists to economically liberals.

In contrast to these large deviations in response behavior, Figure 4 illustrates that affiliates of B90/Grüne as well as Die Linke seem to be relatively in line with political elites, as indicated by the small deviance from zero in the response patterns. One potential reason for the alignment could be the shared, higher educational background that legislators and affiliates of B90/Grüne share. Yet, this does not explain the alignment of Die Linke affiliates. Moreover, attitudes on this issue is likely – in parts – ideologically driven, which makes an alignment with B90/Grüne and Die Linke affiliates not likely, because both parties do not comprise an overwhelming portion of the elite. Against this background, these descriptive results remain puzzling.


Figure 5: Differences Between Citizens and Their Representatives: Attitudes Towards Car Ownership (Based on Weighted Distributions, 95 % Confidence Intervals)



Lastly, turning to the differences between party affiliates and their representatives, i.e., the legislators who share their party affiliation (see Figure 5; also Figure A 1 in the Appendix). Here we can see interesting differences for the CDU/CSU as legislators appear to place more value to property in cars than their supporters. For the SPD it is the other way around, meaning elites are less attached to property than their supporters. The starkest divergence between legislators and supporters of their party exists for B90/Grüne: While B90/Grüne affiliates are already to a greater share satisfied with usage rights without the need for property in cars than citizens more broadly, legislators of B90/Grüne have even more extreme positive attitudes towards property alternatives.

Thus, overall elites appear to hold different attitudes than citizens in general, but also than their supporters. The divergence between citizens and their representatives also suggests that elites are more polarized, as legislators of most parties tend to hold more extreme positions than their voters, in either direction. For the CDU/CSU and AfD, legislators report greater attachment to property than their affiliates, and legislators of SPD, B90/Grüne, and Die Linke appear more open to property alternatives than their affiliates. This suggests that property in car ownership is a politicized topic with ideologically driven cleavages in society and even more pronounced among elites.

Figure 6: Differences Between Citizens and Political Elites: Attitudes Towards Homeownership (Based on Weighted Distributions, 95 % Confidence Intervals)



In regard to the second property object, i.e., housing, elites appear on average more attached to property than the overall citizenry. As Figure 6 highlights, this divergence is mainly driven by the significantly smaller share of responses indicating strong conviction that home ownership is not important (-13 percentage points). That elites overall do not voice strongly that renting is enough could be related to the relevance of homeowning in societal debates and the corresponding various political efforts to support citizens to acquiring their own residential housing. Potentially elites accept the underlying importance of homeownership or that they do refrain from voicing strongly contradictory statements.

That said, it is also possible that the aggregate differences are driven by the differences between legislators and citizens with low and high wealth levels. A visual inspection of the plot per wealth levels in Figure 6 shows, political elites align the most with citizens with medium wealth levels. Between them, there is no significant difference concerning all response levels. On the other hand, differences exist for citizens with low levels of wealth (-19 percentage points) and, more pronounced, for citizens with high levels of wealth (-42 percentage points) in regard to strong agreement that renting their home is sufficient. Moreover, compared to affluent citizens, a significantly greater share of legislators are critical of not owning their residence. (See also Table A 5 in the Appendix.)


Corresponding to elites' alignment with the middle in the wealth distribution, they hold comparable views to homeowners (see Table A 8 in the Appendix). Conversely, elites' response patterns diverge from those of citizens who do not possess housing property. The share of citizens strongly agreeing that home ownership is not important among former is 21 percentage points below the share among the latter. And the odds of viewing renting as sufficient are 1.5 times higher for the latter compared to elites. This is perhaps unsurprising, as 73% of the legislators are homeowners themselves.

Concerning age, the analysis provides evidence that political elites conform with the response patterns of citizens that are below 50 years. For instance, citizens who are aged 50 or more have twice the odds for a more positive attitude towards renting compared to elites. Again, these differences are mainly driven by the much greater share of citizens (above 50 years), who strongly agree that ownership is not important. (See also Table A 6 in the Appendix).

For differences between Eastern and Western Germany, Figure 6 shows for both a pattern that resembles the divergence between elites and the overall citizenry. That means, in both parts of Germany citizens are more favorable to waive ownership as long


as they have usage rights compared to legislators. That said, Figure 6 also shows that for residents of Eastern Germany, differences to elites are more pronounced. The regression confirms this visual impression: While the odds to report more positive attitudes towards renting instead of ownership are roughly 50% higher for West Germans than for elites, the odds for Eastern Germans are almost double those of legislators (see Table A 7 in the Appendix).

Figure 7: Differences Between Citizens and Their Representatives: Attitudes Towards Homeownership (Based on Weighted Distributions, 95 % Confidence Intervals)



Lastly, party affiliation plays a strong role for the responses of elites. The further left a party is, the more their legislators are supportive of the statement that renting a home is sufficient (see Figure 7). Yet, these response patterns are not mirrored among the respective affiliates of all parties. For the CDU/CSU and the SPD, legislators differ statistically significant from their supports. In both parties, legislators are more attached to property and conversely more critical towards renting. This could be further indication of the ideologically motivated concern of the elites of promoting homeownership mentioned earlier, which has a long tradition in both (former) mass parties in Western Germany (Winter 1981). (See also Figure A 2 in the Appendix.)

Figure 8: Differences Between Citizens and Political Elites: Attitudes Towards Music Ownership (Based on Weighted Distributions, 95 % Confidence Intervals)




Turning to the third and final property object, i.e., music, we see broad congruence between the views of the political elites and citizens on the relevance of ownership. Indeed, Figure 8 illustrates that a functional equivalent receives comparable support among, on the one hand, elites, and on the other hand, the broad citizenry, males and females alike (see Table A 11 in the Appendix).

The age variable shows the starkest deviation between the views of the citizens and the elite more generally (see Table A 10 in the Appendix). While legislators do not differ significantly from citizens aged 35 to 64, views of the youngest and oldest age groups differ: The odds of being critical of not owning music are three times higher for elites than for citizens aged 18 to 34, as indicated by the regression. Correspondingly, compared to this age group the share of the elite reporting to strongly disagree that streaming or other functional equivalences are sufficient is 22 percentage points higher, and the share of the elite strongly agreeing is 19 percentage points lower. One reason for this pattern could be that legislators themselves are mostly in the age range from 35 to 64, thus they hold the same views as their cohorts in the citizenry.

Elites' views on the relevance of property in music rather resembles those of citizens without tertiary education (see Figure 8; also Table A 12 in the Appendix). Citizens who have obtained a university degree are, relative to political elites, more likely to support the functional equivalent. Though, as previously, these differences are mainly driven by the smaller share of elites that have a strong positive conviction that ownership in music is important (-12 percentage points).

Figure 9: Differences Between Citizens and Their Representatives: Attitudes Towards Music Ownership (Based on Weighted Distributions, 95 % Confidence Intervals)



Lasty, the differences between party affiliates and the legislators representing them show no significant deviance (see Figure 9; see also Figure A 3 in the Appendix). As there are no obvious (party-)ideological stances, this lack of divergence between elites and their constituents likely indicates that the factors that influence property attitudes concerning streaming correlate with those factors such as age, wealth, or education levels.

Conclusion

In this article we delved into the attitudes of citizens and political elites towards property ownership in everyday objects, i.e., cars, housing, and music. We have approached the understanding of the attitudes from the perspective of the 'Sociology of Our Relationship to the World' by Hartmut Rosa (2019) and investigated the traces of the consequences of the relationships to objects, social others, and oneself that people make in the context of property. Our exploratory analysis shows patterns of attitudes which conformed with our central preliminary assumptions:

First, we can see object related differences to whether citizens are satisfied with usage rights or whether they prefer property ownership in an object. The evaluation of the relevance of ownership is lower for housing or music than for cars. Indeed, it seems owning the car has a particular status among the property objects in regard to citizens' preference for actual ownership. Put differently, citizens are relatively more open for functional equivalences of property for housing and music. However, it must be noted that this broad pattern is significantly driven by responses of citizens with medium (or lower) wealth as citizens with more wealth, who form a minority, show a different response behavior.

Thus, and second, the attitudes diverge per individual characteristics, e.g., in regard to wealth levels, gender, age, and party affiliation of the citizens. While the affluent appear to be less interested in property, it seems to be a significant issue for citizens with medium and especially with lower wealth. For them, it is important to secure their usage rights to an object and this seems to be best achievable through ownership. For housing, we could also show that ownership of the object in question drives the positive attitudes towards property. Thus, it seems that the ability to acquire property or even owning a (lot of) property object(s) is not very influential for attitudes on a specific property object – but rather experiencing the benefits of ownership in this object instigates a positive attitude. Conversely, it is also possible that the experience with property substitutes and its benefits drives citizens away from favoring ownership. We can observe this with carownership, in which possession is experienced as accompanied by obligations. Additional research is necessary to investigate thoroughly to what extend our relationship to property objects differs from those with services. In this context, the role of different service concepts such as sharing and leasing should also be scrutinized in the future.

Third, there is an interaction between object and individual characteristics for influencing attitudes: While wealth levels play a role for cars and housing, they do not influence attitudes towards owning music. Similarly, age only plays a role for housing and music, but there are no age-related differentials for placing importance in car ownership. In particular, our exploratory findings point to interesting relationships between objects and wealth for shaping attitudes: For cars and housing, i.e., objects that reflect a considerable investment and may be a financial asset for citizens, wealth levels matter. Specifically, the affluent hold different views than the rest of citizens. They exhibit relatively high detachment from actual ownership. These findings from the survey resonate with the discussions of our narrative interviews and may be explained by different social status and lifestyle issues. Especially with regard to citizens with lower (and medium) wealth we

found hints that property can be an important factor of stability and controllability as well as meaningful in the social hierarchy which increases a higher attachment to objects such as 'our family car' or 'my home'. For a definitive thesis of a close link between poverty and property, further research is needed. In contrast, the affluent express no emotional need for property in these objects as a financial or mental security. Moreover, in this societal stratum, social prestige is not negotiated over the possession of 'my' own house or car. Instead, the affluent can be characterized by living an unsteady, highly mobile lifestyle in which ownership is experienced as a burdensome obligation. However, and this is quite interesting, for music such patterns do not emerge. It will need further research to find out about this specific relationship towards music and its influencing factors.

All in all, attitudes towards property are very complex and depend on many sociodemographic variables. The fact that property can have very different meanings for people, depending on where they are located in society, must be formulated *individually* for all of the property objects examined in order to gain an increasingly deeper insight into ownership relationships. This article is therefore a first step in analyzing specific property relations whereby our theoretical approach enables us to organize and make sense of these results: Relationships to property are just as diverse and sometimes ambivalent as relationships to the world itself. Our relationship to the world is more complex than our socio-economic location in society. There is no such thing as 'the' relationship to property and, accordingly, property cannot be determined in advance as producing resonant or repulsive world relations or even fundamentally conducive or obstructive to communal or democratic processes. Still socio-economic conditions have a dispositional character insofar as they open up certain spaces for action or not. With this article, however, we have been able to point out some important connections between property, world relations and the variables that contribute to these relations, which at least allows us to identify specific tendencies in each case.

Regarding the political elite, our analysis revealed interesting patterns. Most generally we could show that legislators' attitudes towards property in everyday objects do not match those of the overall population. Rather, they tend to have the same attitudes of citizens that share their characteristics, e.g., in terms of age, gender, or Eastern and Western German residence. Not least, elites tend to share the attitudes of the middle class – but in the case of cars and housing they diverge from those of affluent citizens. Therefore, our findings are not fully in line with the broader findings from the unequal democracy literature, which suggest that representation is biased particularly towards highest social strata (e.g., Bartels 2016; Elkjær and Klitgaard 2021; Gilens and Page 2014; Winters 2011).

However, the results provide support for the claim that descriptive representation – and disproportionately high share of legislators who are economically better off (see also the Data and Methods section) – is an important determinant of the (un-)equal representation of citizens in contemporary democracy (e.g., Gilens 2015; Elsässer and Schäfer 2022).

Furthermore, delving into the attitudes of legislators and the supporters of their respective party reveals various incongruences. This indicates that differences between citizens and the political elite are not driven by a skewed composition of parliament. Rather differences seem to stem from an attitudinal disconnect, which is potentially due to legislators' different background, but also because of their lack of knowing the preferences of their constituents, as recent studies suggest (cf. Broockman and Skovron 2018; Pereira 2021).

Our contribution was made possible by the interdisciplinary cooperation between the SFB 294 projects "Economic Property and Political (In-)Equality" (B04, political science) and "Making Things Available" (C06, sociology): Based on quantitative surveys with citizens and legislators in Germany in 2022, we elaborated on the distribution of property attitudes in the three fields. Going beyond this, we used the qualitative interview research to hypothesize about the potential meaning behind the results of the surveys. Through the combination of our different research designs, focal points, and methodological premises, we productively irritated each other, yielding novel perspectives on property attitudes and desiderata to explore in future research.

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Appendix


Car: Citizens

Table A 1: Ordinal Logistic Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Party (Ref. = CDU/CSU)	
SPD	0.78(0.23)
B90/Grüne	1.82(0.3)
FDP	0.85(0.28)
Die Linke	1.39(0.35)
AfD	0.54*(0.29)
Other	0.87(0.57)
No Affiliation	0.69(0.28)
Wealth Level (Ref. = Middle)	
Low	0.94(0.17)
High	6.41***(0.32)
Age (Ref. = 35 – 49)	
18 - 34	1.41(0.22)
50 - 64	0.91(0.22)
65+	1.02(0.23)
University Degree: Yes	0.93(0.17)
Gender: Female	0.98(0.16)
Germany: East	1(0.17)
1 2	0.36***(0.24)
2 3	1.21(0.25)
3 4	3.53***(0.25)

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Linear Regression Plot



Car: Citizens vs Elites

Ordinal Logistic Regression

Table A 2: Legislators vs. Wealth Levels Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Reference = l	_egislators
Wealth Level	
Low	0.54**(0.2)
Middle	0.59**(0.19)
High	4.14***(0.33)
1 2	0.22***(0.18)
2 3	0.75(0.17)
3 4	2.23***(0.17)

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Table A 3: Legislators vs. Party Affiliate Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)		
Reference = L	Reference = Legislators		
Party			
CDU/CSU	0.81(0.24)		
SPD	0.59*(0.23)		
B90/Grüne	1.16(0.27)		
FDP	1.01(0.27)		
Die Linke	0.83(0.33)		
AfD	0.38***(0.27)		
Other	0.66(0.53)		
No Affiliation	0.5**(0.25)		
1 2	0.23***(0.18)		
2 3	0.75(0.17)		
3 4	2.17***(0.17)		

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$


Housing: Citizens

Table A 4: Ordinal Logistic Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Party (Ref. = CDU/CSU)	
SPD	0.92(0.29)
B90/Grüne	0.75(0.3)
FDP	0.8(0.39)
Die Linke	0.79(0.36)
AfD	0.55(0.37)
Other	0.3(0.89)
No Affiliation	0.69(0.26)
Wealth Level (Ref. = Middle)	
Low	1.38(0.19)
High	13.01***(0.6)
Age (Ref. = 35 – 49)	
18 - 34	0.82(0.26)
50 - 64	1.64*(0.24)
65+	1.87**(0.24)
University Degree: Yes	0.97(0.21)
Gender: Female	1.17(0.18)
Germany: East	1.54*(0.17)
Homeowner: Yes	0.21***(0.21)
Owner of Other Real Estate: Yes	1.07(0.29)
1 2	0.1***(0.34)
2 3	0.58(0.32)
3 4	2.09*(0.32)

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Linear Regression Plot



Housing: Citizens vs. Elites

Ordinal Logistic Regression

Table A 5: Legislators vs. Wealth Levels Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Reference = L	_egislators
Wealth Level	
Low	1.95**(0.22)
Middle	1.13(0.21)
High	5.69***(0.36)
1 2	0.24***(0.2)
2 3	1.13(0.18)
3 4	3.89***(0.19)

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Table A 6: Legislators vs. Age Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)	
Referer	Reference = Legislators	
Age		
18 - 34	1.45(0.23)	
35 - 49	1.23(0.25)	
50 - 64	2.05**(0.22)	
65+	1.61*(0.23)	
1 2	0.24***(0.19)	
2 3	1.13(0.18)	
3 4	3.77***(0.18)	

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Table A 7: Legislators vs. East/West Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Reference	e = Legislators
Germany	
West	1.51*(0.19)
East	1.95**(0.2)
1 2	0.24***(0.19)
2 3	1.14(0.18)
3 4	3.74***(0.18)

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Table A 8: Legislators vs. Homeownership Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Reference = I	Legislators
Homeowner	
No	2.54***(0.21)
Yes	0.77(0.22)
1 2	0.23***(0.2)
2 3	1.14(0.18)
3 4	3.92***(0.19)

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$


Music: Citizens

Table A 9: Ordinal Logistic Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Party (Ref. = CDU/CSU)	
SPD	0.77(0.24)
B90/Grüne	0.88(0.3)
FDP	0.89(0.36)
Die Linke	0.94(0.41)
AfD	0.69(0.35)
Other	0.68(0.73)
No Affiliation	0.72(0.26)
Wealth Level (Ref. = Middle)	
Low	1.06(0.17)
High	0.94(0.31)
Age (Ref. = 35 – 49)	
18 - 34	2.38***(0.23)
50 - 64	0.57**(0.22)
65+	0.32***(0.24)
University Degree: Yes	1.63**(0.18)
Gender: Female	1.39*(0.16)
Germany: East	0.76(0.18)
1 2	0.19***(0.28)
2 3	0.56*(0.27)
3 4	1.83*(0.26)

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Linear Regression Plot



Music: Citizens vs. Elite

Ordinal Logistic Regression

Table A 10: Legislators vs. Age Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)	
Referer	Reference = Legislators	
Age		
18 - 34	3.01***(0.25)	
35 - 49	1.34(0.25)	
50 - 64	0.71(0.24)	
65+	0.48**(0.25)	
1 2	0.26***(0.22)	
2 3	0.7(0.2)	
3 4	2.16***(0.2)	

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Table A 11: Legislators vs. Gender Regression Table

Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
ce = Legislators
1.06(0.22)
1.25(0.22)
0.28***(0.21)
0.72(0.2)
2.05***(0.19)

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Table A 12: Legislators vs. Education Regression Table

	Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Reference = Legislators	
University Degree	
No	1(0.21)
Yes	1.69*(0.23)
1 2	0.28***(0.21)
2 3	0.71(0.2)
3 4	2.06***(0.2)

^{*} $p \le 0.05$; ** $p \le 0.01$; *** $p \le 0.001$

Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 294 STRUKTURWANDEL DES EIGENTUMS This article explores the relationship between property ownership and usage rights in individuals and objects,

ownership and usage rights in contemporary societies, focusing on attitudes towards everyday objects such as cars, housing, and music, from the perspective of the 'Sociology of Our Relationship to the World'. We use a multi-method approach, i.e., drawing on data from surveys of both citizens and political elites and informing these data through a corpus of narrative interviews. We quantitatively analyze how different factors, including socio-economic traits (e.g. wealth, gender, age) and party affiliation, shape citizens' attitudes towards these issues and try to make sense of these findings by qualitatively exploring how these factors irritate and influence their relationship to the world.

Our collaborative results reveal nuanced differences across individuals and objects, highlighting the interplay between personal characteristics and property attitudes. Moreover, we investigate the attitudes of political elites and observe that they tend to align with constituents who share similar demographic traits, particularly concerning wealth and regional background. Thus, the interdisciplinary cooperation between the SFB-projects "Economic Property and Political (In-)Equality" (B04) and "Making Things Available" (C06) contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding property relationships and their societal implications.





